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Outstanding analysis of the protocol-specific monitoring gap in OT security. Your point about FENNEC's 90 percent compliance reduction speaks to something deeper than automation, its the architectural shift from evidence-gathering theater to continuous control verification. Most platforms still bolt IT-centric detection onto OT environments and wonder why coverage falters at the firmware layer. What makes the MITRE ATT&CK mapping particularly relevant here is that industrial control system attack patterns dont map cleanly to enterprise frameworks, which means correlation engines trained on IT telemetry miss the silent modification vulnerabilities that matter most in legacy SCADA environments. The air-gapped environment claim is interesting though, because truly isolated systems cant send telemetry without breaking isolation. Im curious whether FENNEC uses unidirectional gateways or relies on episodic sync from isolated collectors. The real testfor any OT platform is whether it can distinguish between benign protocol drift and pre-attack reconnaissance without drowning operators in false positives, especially during planned maintenance windows when behavioral baselines shift.

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